The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Master's Theses
Spring 2022

Assessing the effect of negative mood states on valencedependent belief updating
Aleksandr Karnick

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Karnick, Aleksandr, "Assessing the effect of negative mood states on valence-dependent belief updating"
(2022). Master's Theses. 871.
https://aquila.usm.edu/masters_theses/871

This Masters Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For
more information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.

ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF NEGATIVE MOOD STATES ON VALENCEDEPENDENT BELIEF UPDATING

by
Aleksandr T. Karnick

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate School,
the College of Education and Human Sciences
and the School of Psychology
at The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts

Approved by:
Dr. Daniel W. Capron, Committee Chair
Dr. Kelsey Bonfils
Dr. Donald Sacco

May 2022

COPYRIGHT BY

Aleksandr T. Karnick

2022

Published by the Graduate School

ABSTRACT
Individuals consistently tend to underestimate the likelihood of negative events
happening to them and fail to update these beliefs adequately when provided with
statistical evidence. However, depressed populations are better able to accurately update
beliefs. It is not clear if the ability to update beliefs effectively is due to overall dysphoria
or are partially due to momentary fluctuations of acute affective states. Undergraduates
(N=83) completed a belief updating task where they estimated the likelihood of a
negative event happening to them, were presented with the actual likelihood of the event,
and then re-estimated the likelihood of the event happening to them. Prior to completing
the belief updating task participants were randomized to undergo a neutral or a negative
(i.e., sadness) mood induction. After completing the task participants completed the other
mood induction and the belief updating task a second time with a second list of events.
Whether information was desirable or undesirable (i.e., whether the initial estimate was
higher or lower than the actual base rate) had a significant effect on belief updates (F(1,
72) = 22.126, p < .001, η_G^2 = .042). No significant effect was found between acute
hopelessness and belief updates. Linear mixed modelling revealed a significant
interaction effect of information type and induction on belief updates (β = -4.15, SE =
1.09, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.29, -2.00). Analyses that accounted for intra-individual and
trial-by-trial variation indicated that experiencing a sadness mood induction interacted
with the type of information received to reduce optimism bias.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The purpose of the current study is to evaluate the effects of mood and affect dysfunction
on human decision-making processes. Human decision-making processes are dependent
on an individual’s beliefs about the outcomes of future events. These decisions could
directly affect the expected outcome (e.g., flipping a light switch or turning a key in a
lock), or they could depend on expected future outcomes (e.g., investing in retirement or
buying insurance). In both cases, in order to make a rational decision an individual must
make predictions about how a current decision will result in a future outcome or be
affected by future events to lead to an outcome. According to Rational Decision Theory
(RDT), a model describing optimal economic decisions, choices should maximize
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), which is the probability weighted sum of utilities for
the possible outcomes of the choices (Koechlin, 2020; Lee, 2006). However, it has
frequently been observed that actual human decisions diverge from purely rational
choices in multiple domains.
In recent years a large number of cognitive biases have been identified in
behavioral economics and experimental psychology research that demonstrate scenarios
in which actual human decisions diverge from SEUs. These cognitive biases are instances
where human cognition produces systematic distortions in representations of objective
reality (Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015). It has been argued that there are three main
reasons that these cognitive biases can arise from an evolutionary perspective: 1.) natural
selection favors a cognitive shortcut that is not applicable in all situations (i.e.,
heuristics); 2.) a situation arises for which human cognitive ability is not optimized
1

(artifacts); and 3.) biased cognitive response patterns result in lower “error costs” than
unbiased responses (error management biases) (Haselton et al., 2015). Examples of
cognitive biases include the base rate fallacy (i.e., the tendency for individuals to ignore
relevant information about base rates when judging the likelihood of an event occurring)
(Allen, Preiss, & Gayle, 2006), the continued influence effect (i.e., the continued
influence of incorrect prior beliefs in the face of new disconfirming evidence) (Johnson
& Seifert, 1994), and the backfire effect (i.e., when prior beliefs become more entrenched
when presented with contradictory evidence) (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). This cluster of
cognitive biases is related to systematic errors in the process by which individuals
incorporate new information to past beliefs (i.e., priors) to form new beliefs about the
future (i.e., posteriors).
The process through which individuals incorporate new information into prior
beliefs to adjust their predictions about the outcomes of future events can be modeled
using Bayes Theorem (Fennell & Baddeley, 2012). Briefly, Bayes theorem suggests that
a posterior probability distribution of a hypothesized causal relationship given a new
piece of information is defined by the product of the probability of the new information
given the hypothesized relationship and the prior probability of the hypothesized
relationship divided by the prior probability of the new piece of information (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1975). A reformulation of this relationship shows that the amount that beliefs
about a hypothesized causal relationship should change is a function of the likelihood
ratio (i.e., the value of the new information for accurately predicting the outcomes of the
relationship) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975).
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Another important theoretical formulation defining the method by which
individuals make decisions relates to that person’s beliefs about future prospects (i.e.,
gains and losses). Kahneman and Tversky argued that individuals will make decisions
based on their beliefs about prospects as a function of their current “reference point” as a
marker for the value of a potential gain or loss (i.e., Prospect Theory) (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). This can lead to decisions that are biased away from those that would
strictly maximize SEU. Kahneman further theorized that decisions biased away from
optimal choices according to RDT are due to cognitive heuristics. Specifically, a “fast”
cognitive process that recruits fewer mental resources and provides more immediate
appraisals than an alternative, more deliberate, “slow” process leads to the biased
cognitive appraisals (Kahneman, 2013). These fast cognitive appraisals may be the cause
of consistent diversions from SEU resulting in predictable effects of bias in the synthesis
of priors with reference frames.
One of these cognitive biases that has been consistently observed – optimism bias
– is related to an individual’s beliefs about their likelihood of experiencing negative
versus positive events (Weinstein, 1980, 1982). When individuals estimate their own
attributes and abilities, most report more positives and fewer negatives than average – a
statistical impossibility (Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986; Hoorens, 1993). Additionally,
individuals demonstrate optimism about their susceptibility to health problems
(Weinstein, 1982) and future life events (Weinstein, 1980), overestimate their own
driving (Svenson, 1981) and cognitive abilities (Dunning, 2011; Schlösser, Dunning,
Johnson, & Kruger, 2013), and overestimate the quality of their own relationships
relative to others’ (Schriber, Larwood, & Peterson, 1985). In the context of decision3

making as outlined above, the tendency for individuals to overestimate the likelihood of
positive life events and underestimate the likelihood of negative ones should therefore be
incorporated into Bayesian priors when predicting how individuals will make choices
under uncertainty.
Prior research has found reduced optimism bias in belief updating for depressed
(Garrett et al., 2014; Korn, Sharot, Walter, Heekeren, & Dolan, 2014) and highfunctioning autistic populations (Kuzmanovic, Rigoux, & Vogeley, 2019). Other research
has indicated that high trait optimism moderates the presence of self-specific optimism
bias, but that individuals with lower trait optimism demonstrate reduced optimistic
updating for both themselves and a “similar other” (Kuzmanovic, Jefferson, & Vogeley,
2015). However, while this information is useful for better understanding how optimism
bias differs across certain clinical populations, relatively little information regarding
acute emotionality and belief updating has been researched.
One recent study has investigated the effect of acute state changes on belief
updating (Garrett, González-Garzón, Foulkes, Levita, & Sharot, 2018). Garrett et. al.
(2018) experimentally induced perceived threat in a sample of undergraduates by
informing participants that they would be required to give a recorded speech on a surprise
topic to be graded by a panel of five faculty. In a second experiment, they recruited a
sample of fire fighters who were instructed to complete study procedures between calls
while on shift to assess perceived threat in a non-experimentally induced natural setting.
Both groups were given a belief updating task to complete along with measures of acute
anxiety and threat. In the first group, participants integrated bad news into prior beliefs
such that biased belief updating observed in low threat groups vanished under
4

experimental conditions. In the second group, firefighters with more self-reported acute
anxiety had greater integration of bad news into beliefs in a “natural setting” (Garrett et
al., 2018).
Still, a crucial gap remains in the understanding of affective states and belief
updating. While clinical depression (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014) and trait
optimism (Kuzmanovic et al., 2015) have been found to be related to a reduction in
optimistic belief updating, it is not clear if these effects are due solely to factors theorized
to be more static, such as personality or persistent dysphoria, or if they are sensitive to
moment-to-moment affective fluctuations. Furthermore, as previously stated Garrett et.
al. (2018) demonstrated that stress and threat states unrelated to more stable individual
factors can reduce the effect of optimism bias on belief updating when induced in
participants experimentally. However, it is not clear if affective states related to
dysphoria and depression - specifically sadness - are associated with reduced optimistic
belief updating.
Determining whether biased belief updating is suppressed only in trait-level
depression or low trait-level optimism, or if these effects are at least partially dependent
on momentary fluctuations to affective states carries implications for several domains of
psychological functioning. Specifically, improving the understanding of affective factors
on belief-bias updating will allow for better modelling of individual decision-making
under uncertainty by indicating how affective states can be incorporated to interpret
predictions about the future according to RDT, Bayes Theorem, and Prospect Theory.

5

1.1.1 Measurement of Optimism Bias
The usual method of studying optimism bias has historically been to ask
participants to compare their likelihood of experiencing a negative life event with the
likelihood of the average person to experience one (i.e., the direct comparison method;
Harris & Hahn, 2011). This method has several weaknesses, namely, the presence of
attenuated response scales, the under-sampling of population minorities, and regressive
population base rate estimates can cause rational individuals to produce response patterns
to the direct comparison method that approximate optimism bias (Harris & Hahn, 2011;
Shah, Harris, Bird, Catmur, & Hahn, 2016). Harris and Hahn (2011) further argue that
optimism bias may simply be a statistical artifact due to selection biases and poor study
design and that the inclusion of rare positive events is a critical test for distinguishing
genuine optimistic responding.
In response to these types of criticisms, a relatively large body of research on
optimism bias has been developed in recent years using the “update method” (Garrett &
Sharot, 2014, 2016; Garrett et al., 2014, 2018; Kappes & Sharot, 2019; Korn et al., 2014;
Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Kuzmanovic & Rigoux, 2017; Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot &
Garrett, 2016; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012; Sharot, Korn, &
Dolan, 2011). Instead of having participants compare their odds of experiencing a
negative event to their beliefs about an average person, the update method requires
participants to estimate their likelihood of experiencing a positive or negative event. They
are then presented with the actual population base rate data for the event, and then they
are asked to re-estimate their likelihood of experiencing the event. In this way, the update
method assesses optimism bias by measuring people’s updated estimates in response to
6

desirable or undesirable information. These studies have consistently found large effect
sizes for an optimism bias for belief updating, where individuals with less desirable
information (i.e., are informed that the actual base rate of experiencing a negative event is
greater than they estimated for themselves) update their beliefs less than when they
receive more desirable information (i.e., are informed that the actual base rate of
experiencing a negative event is less than they estimated for themselves).
1.2 Present Study
The present study used the belief update method in conjunction with a mood
induction to assess the relationship between acute affective states and optimism bias. To
accomplish this, participants completed a belief update paradigm using PsychoPy3
simulation software through the Pavlovia.org online portal (Peirce et al., 2019).
Participants were divided into two groups. Group A viewed a negative (i.e., sadness)
mood induction video and completed half of the belief updating task. They then viewed a
neutral mood induction video and completed the remainder of the belief updating task.
Procedures were similar for Group B, though they completed the neutral mood induction
first and the negative mood induction second. Following each induction video,
participants completed an attention check, a brief measure of hopelessness, and a brief
measure of the effectiveness of the induction.
There were two major hypotheses tested in this study. First, it was hypothesized
that optimistically biased belief updating would be observed in participants following the
neutral mood induction, but that this effect would be reduced or absent following the
negative mood induction. Second, we hypothesized that acute hopelessness measures
would be negatively associated with optimistically biased belief updating.
7

CHAPTER II – METHODS
2.1 Participants
Participants comprised undergraduate students at the University of Southern
Mississippi recruited through the psychology department participant pool (SONA).
GPower software was used to calculate the required number of participants to detect a
moderate-to-large effect size (f=0.35, α=0.05, Power=0.80) using Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). GPower indicated that a total sample size
of 82 would be sufficient to detect the hypothesized effect. Participants were granted
SONA credits as compensation for participation, which can be used for course credit.
Only participants over 18 years of age and eligible to receive SONA credits for course
credit were included in the study. Participants were also required to confirm stable
internet access and the ability to access a web browser compatible with the web
distribution of PsychoPy3 via the Pavlovia.org web link. Participants unable to access the
online study were excluded.
2.2 Materials
PsychoPy3 (PsychoPy3; Peirce et. al., 2019): PsychoPy3 is a versatile stimulus
presentation software package built on the Python programming language with built-in
online integration functions through Java scripting which allow for browser based
delivery of stimuli (Peirce et al., 2019). PsychoPy3 and the associated online browser
delivery service (Pavlovia.org) have been validated for the delivery and measurement of
online stimulus and response data with reaction time precision under 4 milliseconds
online (Bridges, Pitiot, MacAskill, & Peirce, 2020). The belief updating task was coded
using PsychoPy3 and delivered to participants as a web link hosted on Pavlovia.org.
8

Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; Aish et
al., 2001). A shortened four-item version of the BHS was used to measure acute
hopelessness following each mood induction. The full form of the BHS is a 20-item selfreport measure of hopelessness and pessimism with well-established psychometric
properties (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). Validity of a shortened, four-item
version of the BHS has been established for the measurement of acute hopelessness in
ecological momentary assessment (Aish, Wasserman, & Renberg, 2001).
Emotional Response Scale (Gilman et al., 2017). An acute emotional response
measure was presented to participants following mood induction to assess the
effectiveness of video stimuli to induce the intended affective state. Words describing
emotional states were presented to participants using a Likert scale indicating the extent
to which they experienced the indicated word ranging from 1 (none) to 7 (strong),
consistent with procedures established in prior emotion elicitation research (Gilman et al.,
2017). A total of four emotion descriptors (sadness, surprise, happiness, disgust) were
selected to limit burden on participants.
Memory and Other Controls (Garrett et al., 2018). At the end of the experiment
participants were required to report the actual probability that had previously been
reported to them during the belief updating procedure to test for memory effects.
Additionally, participants were asked to rate stimuli used in the procedure according to 5
factors (i.e., vividness, familiarity, prior experience, emotional arousal, negativity)
describing their experience of the stimuli using a 6-point Likert scale (i.e., 1=not at all,
6=very).
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2.3 Procedure
Participants were recruited through the SONA system for human subject recruitment at
the University of Southern Mississippi and randomly assigned to one of two conditions
(i.e., receiving a neutral mood induction first, followed by a negative/sadness mood
induction or receiving the negative mood induction first). Randomization was used to
mitigate any order effects due to the mood induction and participation.
Participants were directed to a Qualtrics survey link where they completed a
consent form and received detailed instructions about how to complete the study and
details about its purpose. After completing the informed consent, participants completed
baseline assessment measures (see Materials above). Baseline measures included basic
demographic information and other baseline psychological information.
2.3.1 Belief Updating Procedure
Participants were directed to an online interface (i.e., Pavlovia.org) developed
using PsychoPy3, a social science software package for stimulus presentation via weblink
(Peirce et al., 2019). The belief updating task (see Sharot & Garrett, 2016 for a review)
was used in this study. Participants viewed instructions for completing the online belief
updating task and entered basic demographic information (i.e., sex and race) to generate
appropriate likelihood data for their demographic group. They then completed a practice
trial of the task with three events.
Event stimuli used in the belief updating task comprised 80 short descriptions of
negative life events divided into two lists of 40 items (Garrett et al., 2018; Garrett &
Sharot, 2014; Kappes & Sharot, 2019; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015; Moutsiana et al., 2013;
Sharot et al., 2011). Participants were randomly assigned one of the lists of 40 items for
10

the belief updating task. The task presented participants with a potential life event (e.g.,
depression, robbery, car accident, cockroach infestation) and a prompt asking them to
estimate the potential likelihood of that event happening to them (3 seconds). Participants
were informed at the outset that all likelihoods fall between 3% and 77% for their
demographic, but only events with a likelihood between 10% and 70% were actually
included in the task to allow for over and underestimation of all possible events.
Participants were then presented with a visual analogue scale with reference markers at
3% (i.e., minimum likelihood), 77% (i.e., maximum likelihood), and 40% (i.e., midpoint
likelihood). They were then required to select a spot on the scale corresponding to their
belief about the likelihood of the event happening to them. After selection, a display
generating the percent corresponding to their selection appeared on the screen and a
prompt to move to the next slide was generated. At this point participants were free to
change their scores or move to the next stimulus.
When they selected a likelihood, a fixation cross was generated (2 to 5 seconds,
jittered) and they were then presented with the actual likelihood of the event happening to
someone in their corresponding demographic group (3 seconds). Another fixation cross
was generated (2 to 5 seconds, jittered), and the next event rating procedure was
generated. When the participant completed all the initial event ratings for their trial, they
then completed likelihood updates for each of the events presented to them.
During the update segment of each trial, participants were again presented with
each event from the initial rating segment (3 seconds). They were then asked to re-rate
the likelihood of that event happening to them using the visual analogue scale. After
rating the likelihood of each event participants were presented with a fixation cross (2 to
11

5 seconds, jittered) before moving on to the next event. Following the update procedure,
participants were asked to rate the actual likelihood that had been previously presented to
them for each of the events listed in the procedure as well as according to the vividness,
familiarity, prior experience, emotional arousal, and negativity of the events for them.
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the belief update procedure visually.
After participants completed the three-event practice trial they viewed a short
(approximately 2.5 minute) mood induction based on their random assignment. For the
neutral mood induction, participants viewed a video titled “Wild Denali” that has been
shown to elicit little to no emotional reaction in participants (Gilman et al., 2017; Gross
& Levenson, 1995; Jenkins & Andrewes, 2012). For the negative/sadness mood
induction, participants viewed a clip from the film “The Champ” (1979) that has been
demonstrated to induce a single emotional state (i.e., sadness) to the exclusion of other
measured emotional states with very high salience (Gilman et al., 2017; Gross &
Levenson, 1995; Jenkins & Andrewes, 2012). After viewing the video, participants
completed a question asking about the content of the video as an attention check and a
brief questionnaire (i.e., emotional response scale, shortened BHS, Brief Acute Suicide
Measure). After completing the mood induction, attention check, and brief questionnaire,
participants completed the belief updating task on the first 20 events from the randomly
selected list of 40 events. When they completed this, they viewed the induction video
they did not view in the first trial, completed another attention check, brief questionnaire,
and another belief updating task on the second 20 events from the randomly selected list
of 40 events.

12

Figure 2.1 Study procedure
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2.4 Data Analytic Plan
The primary hypothesis of this study (i.e., that optimistically biased belief updating
would be observed in participants following the neutral mood induction, but that this
effect would be reduced or absent following the negative mood induction) was analyzed
using ANOVA and the procedure outlined by Garrett et. al., 2018. Individual event trials
were be partitioned according whether they represented “desirable information” (i.e., the
likelihood presented was lower than their initial estimate) or “undesirable information”
(i.e., the likelihood presented was higher than their initial estimate). Estimation errors
(EE) and belief update (BU) scores were then calculated. EEs are the difference between
the initial estimate (IE) and the actual base rate (aBR) and BUs are the difference
between the IE and the re-estimate (RE) when the EE is positive and the RE from the IE
when the EE is negative. All statistical procedures were completed using the R
environment for statistical computing (R Core Team, 2019).
2.4.1 Hypothesis 1
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were calculated to measure the
association between EEs and BUs for each participant in the study at each level of
information (i.e., desirable and undesirable information) and induction (i.e., negative and
neutral induction). This resulted in four sets of Pearson correlations generated for each
participant (i.e., desirable information/neutral induction, undesirable information/negative
induction, desirable information/neutral induction, undesirable information/negative
induction). Data were then screened for outliers, normality, homogeneity of variance, and
sphericity. Correlations were submitted to a 3-way ANOVA with information (i.e.,
14

desirable/undesirable news) and induction (i.e., negative/neutral induced mood) as
within-subjects measures and group (i.e., negative/neutral mood induction first) as a
between-subjects factor.
2.4.2 Hypothesis 2
To test the second hypothesis (i.e., acute hopelessness measures will be negatively
associated with optimistically biased belief updating), a multiple regression model was
generated predicting each Pearson correlation estimate with hopelessness as a covariate.
Acute hopelessness following each induction was calculated using the brief 4-item BHS
measure (see above) and included in the model. Statistical significance was determined at
α = 0.95.
2.4.3 Exploratory Modelling
Finally, exploratory statistical methodology was conducted following the protocol
developed by Marks and Baines (Marks & Baines, 2017) using linear mixed modelling
(LMM). BUs were entered as the dependent variable with information (i.e.,
desirable/undesirable information) and induction (i.e., negative/neutral induction) as
fixed factors with interaction, subject as a random factor, and EEs, emotional arousal,
familiarity, negativity, prior experience, and vividness as covariates. Additional models
were planned to be generated based on significance identified in the more complex model
to achieve the most parsimonious model with the best fit to the data. Likelihood ratio
tests and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
scores were used to compare model fit for LMMs.

15

CHAPTER III – Results
3.1 Demographics
A total of 88 participants completed all phases of the study. Five participants
failed validity checks (i.e., attention checks following inductions) and were excluded
from further analysis yielding a final study sample of 83. Of these 43 (51.8%) were
randomized to receive the neutral mood induction first during the belief updating portion
of the study, while 40 (48.2%) received the negative mood induction first. The sample
comprised 65 (78.3%) female, 18 (21.7%) male participants, 53 (63.9%) White, 23
(27.8%) Black, four (4.8%) Hispanic or Latino/a, two (2.4%) multi-race or multi-ethnic,
and one (1.2%) Asian participants. Participants were distributed relatively evenly across
year in school with 20 (24.1%) freshmen, 19 (22.9%) sophomores, 15 (18.1%) juniors,
and 23 (27.7%) seniors with an additional five (6.0%) students in their 5th year of
undergraduate education and one (1.2%) graduate student. The average age of
participants was 24.5 (SD=9.1). Following the negative (sadness) mood induction,
participants’ mean self-rated sadness was 5.9 (SD = 0.8) but was 1.4 (SD = 1.6)
following the neutral mood induction. Mean sadness scores following each induction
were compared using Welch’s two-sample t-test and the difference was found to be
statistically significant, t(123) = 23.3, p < .001. See Table 3.1 for a summary of
demographic data.
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Table 3.1
Demographic information
Mean (SD)
Age

24.5 (9.1)

Sadness
Negative Induction

5.9 (0.81)

Neutral Induction

1.4 (1.56)

N (%)
Total

83 (100.0)

Sex
Female

65 (78.3)

Male

18 (21.7)

Race
White

53 (63.9)

Black

23 (27.8)

Hispanic/Latino(a)

4 (4.8)

Multi-ethnic

2 (2.4)

17

Asian

1 (1.2)

Year
First

20 (24.1)

Second

19 (22.9)

Third

15 (18.1)

Fourth

23 (27.7)

Fifth

5 (6.0)

Graduate

1 (1.2)

Induction Group
Neutral first

43 (51.8)

Negative first

40 (48.2)

18

3.2 Primary Analyses
3.2.1 Effect of mood induction on belief updates
Data were partitioned for each participant based on whether their EE score was
positive (i.e., initial estimate higher than base rate; desirable information) or negative
(i.e., initial estimate lower than base rate; undesirable information) and whether the
estimates occurred following the negative or neutral mood induction. A Pearson
correlation coefficient for each BU/EE relationship was calculated. This procedure
yielded a total of 332 Pearson correlations for analysis.
Next, data were screened for outliers using the identify_outliers function from the
r package rstatix (Kassambara, 2020). Extreme outliers (i.e., greater than three times the
interquartile range below the first quartile or above the third quartile) and correlations
equal to 1 or 0 were removed from further analysis. Normality of the sample distribution
was then tested using the Shapiro-Wilk test and density (Figure 3.1) and qq plots (Figure
3.2) were generated to visually inspect normality of data. Data were significantly
negatively skewed (-1.18) and violated normality assumptions. To address this, an
inverse transformation was performed and tested using the same procedures (see Figures
3.3 and 3.4 for transformed density and QQ plots, respectively). While skew was
improved (-0.26), several partitioned groups still failed the Shapiro-Wilk tests of
normality and data should be interpreted with this limitation in consideration. See Table
3.2 for a full summary of data included in analysis following exclusion of outliers and
data transformation.
Homogeneity of variances was assessed using Levene’s test (Levene, 1960).
These tests were not significant for any subgroup indicating that the data did not violate
19

the assumption of homogeneity of variances. Finally, tests of sphericity and sphericity
corrections were conducted within the package rstatix (Kassambara, 2020) during
analyses.
These data were used in the three-way ANOVA to assess effects of mood
induction on biased belief updating. Results indicated that information (i.e., whether the
initial estimate was higher or lower than the actual base rate) had a significant effect on
correlations between EEs and BUs (F(1, 72) = 22.126, p < .001, 𝜂𝐺2 = .042). No other
main effects or interactions had a significant effect on the outcome of interest. Results of
the ANOVA are presented in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.2
Summary of correlations and acute hopelessness following removal of outliers and data
transformation
Correlations

Hopelessness

Information

Valence

Group

N

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Undesirable

Negative

Neutral first

34

.679

.189

1.154

.246

Undesirable

Neutral

Neutral first

37

.707

.169

1.068

.183

Desirable

Negative

Neutral first

37

.766

.164

1.142

.240

Desirable

Neutral

Neutral first

38

.787

.158

1.066

.181

Undesirable

Negative

Negative first

42

.733

.142

1.167

.263

Undesirable

Neutral

Negative first

41

.710

.161

1.146

.237

Desirable

Negative

Negative first

42

.780

.143

1.167

.263

Desirable

Neutral

Negative first

41

.776

.168

1.146

.237
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Table 3.3
ANOVA analysis assessing effect of induction (valence) on belief updating
DFn

DFd

F

p

𝜼𝟐𝑮

Group

1

72

1.774

0.187

.012

Information

1

72

22.126

<.001

.042

Induction

1

72

.051

.823

<.001

Group:Information

1

72

.458

.501

<.001

Group:Induction

1

72

.651

.422

.002

News:Induction

1

72

.209

.649

<.001

Group:Information:Induction

1

72

.036

.849

<.001

Effect
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Figure 3.1 Untransformed density plot
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Figure 3.2 Untransformed QQ plot
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Figure 3.3 Transformed density plot
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Figure 3.4 Transformed QQ plot
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3.2.2 Effect of hopelessness on belief updates
To ensure that data did not violate assumptions for multiple regression, processed
data from initial analysis assessing the effect of mood induction on belief updates were
used to assess the second hypothesis assessing the effect of hopelessness on belief
updates. Measures of acute hopelessness following the presentation of neutral and
negative mood inductions were averaged at the participant level and matched to each
observation. A full summary of hopelessness scores for the sample is included in Table
3.2. A multiple linear regression was performed that included the EE-BU correlations as
the dependent variable and information, induction, group, and hopelessness included as
independent variables. Results indicated that information type had a statistically
significant effect on EE-BU correlation (β = 0.69, SE = 0.018, p < .001, 95% CI = .03,
.11). No other variable had a significant effect on outcomes. Regression results are
summarized in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4
Multiple regression analysis examining the effect of acute hopelessness on belief updates

Pearson Correlations
β

p

Desirable Information

.069

<.001

Neutral Induction

.003

.888

Negative First Group

.016

.392

Hopelessness

-.026

.510

Predictor

R2

.048
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F

3.857

3.3 Exploratory analyses
3.3.1 Effect of mood induction and stimulus ratings on belief updates using linear
mixed modelling
An LMM (Model 1) including all variables of interest was first conducted using the r
packages lme4 and lmerTest (Bates, 2010; Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017).
Results of this model indicated significant main effects for induction (β = 2.2, SE = .76, p
= .004, 95% CI = .72, 3.68) and EE score (β = .11, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% CI = .07, .15).
Additionally, a significant interactive effect for induction by information was found (β =
-4.04.69, SE = .02, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.18, -1.90). No stimuli rating variables had a
significant effect on the model. Full regression results are summarized in Table 3.5.
Based on these findings a simplified model (Model 2) including variables that had
a significant effect on the more complex model and the information variable were
included in a follow-up LMM. This model demonstrated significant main effects for
induction (β = 2.25, SE = 0.76, p = .003, 95% CI = .77, 3.73) and EE scores (β = 0.12, SE
= 0.02, p < .001, 95% CI = .08, .16) as well as for the interactive effect of induction by
information (β = -4.15, SE = 1.09, p < .001, 95% CI = -6.29, -2.00). Full regression
results are summarized in Table 3.6.
Models were compared using a log-likelihood ratio test (LRT) as well as AIC and
BIC fit statistics. AIC scores for Model 1 (AIC = 26,415.3) were less than Model 2 (AIC
= 26,424.0), while BIC scores for Model 1 (BIC = 26,488) were only marginally greater
than Model 2 (BIC = 26,466.4). Additionally, the LRT indicated a significant
improvement in model fit and parsimony (χ2 = 18.7, p = .002) when comparing the loglikelihood statistics for Model 1 (LL = -13,195.6) to Model 2 (LL = -13,205.0).
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Collectively, these findings indicate that Model 2 is a more parsimonious model with
superior fit to Model 1 and was retained for further analysis.
The interaction effect between induction and information variables on Model 2
were further probed using estimated marginal (EM) means analysis with the r package
emmeans (Russell, 2019). EM means were calculated for each induction and information
combination (see Table 3.7). Additionally, an interaction plot for EM means was
generated (see Figure 3.5). Visual inspection of the EM means interaction plot indicate
that the observed induction by information interaction was due to the fact that belief
updates following the neutral mood induction were increased for desirable relative to
undesirable information, while the inverse relationship (i.e., that belief updates were
greater for undesirable information relative to desirable information) was observed
following the negative mood induction.
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Table 3.5
Linear mixed model analyses assessing the association between induction, information,
stimulus scores, error estimates, and belief updates (Model 1)

95% Confidence Interval
Upper

Lower

β

SE

T

p

Bound

Bound

2.20

.76

2.91

.004

.72

3.68

Information

.65

1.07

.61

.541

-1.44

2.74

EE

.11

.02

5.29

<.001

.07

.15

Vividness

.28

.24

1.17

.241

-.19

.75

Prior Experience

.15

.25

.61

.540

-.34

.65

Arousal

.20

.24

.80

.424

-.28

.68

Negativity

-.06

.21

-0.28

.782

-.48

.36

Familiarity

.43

.27

1.59

.111

-.10

.95

-4.04

1.09

-3.71

<.001

-6.18

-1.90

Neutral Induction
Undesirable

Induction:Information
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Table 3.6
Simplified linear mixed model analysis assessing the association between induction,
information, error updates, and belief updates (Model 2)
95% Confidence Interval
β

SE

T

p

Neutral Induction

2.25

.76

2.97

.003

.77

3.73

Undesirable Information

.78

1.07

.73

.467

-1.32

2.88

EE

.12

.02

5.83

< .001

.08

.16

-6.29

-2.00

Induction:Information

-4.15 1.09 -3.79 < .001
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Lower Bound Upper Bound

Table 3.7
Estimated marginal means for induction by information interaction in Model 2
95% Confidence Interval
Induction

Information EM Mean

SE

df

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Negative

Desirable

10.62

.76

450

9.13

12.11

Neutral

Desirable

12.87

.77

477

11.35

14.38

Negative

Undesirable

11.40

.79

522

9.84

12.95

Neutral

Undesirable

9.50

.79

511

7.95

11.05
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Figure 3.5 Interaction plot for EM means for induction by information interaction
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CHAPTER IV – DISCUSSION
The purpose of the present study was to examine associations between mood
states, specifically sadness, on belief updating. First, we hypothesized that watching a
movie selected to induce sadness would be associated with less optimistically biased
belief updating in response to undesirable information compared to watching a neutral
movie. Second, we hypothesized that acute hopelessness would be associated with
reduced optimistically biased belief updating. Based on our primary analyses, we did not
find evidence supporting our first hypothesis. We did find evidence of optimistically
biased belief updating when receiving undesirable information versus desirable
information (i.e., that individuals updated their beliefs less when they were presented
with information that indicated that negative future events were more likely to happen to
them than when the information indicated that negative events were more likely). This
was indicated by a significantly higher correlation with a small to moderate effect size
(𝜂𝐺2 = .042) between belief updates and estimation errors when individuals received
desirable information relative to undesirable information. However, our primary analysis
revealed no significant effect of induction group on the correlations between BUs and
EEs and no significant interactions between induction, group (i.e., whether they received
the negative or neutral induction first), and information type.
These results were somewhat surprising due to prior findings regarding optimistic
belief updating. While previous studies identified an association between increased trait
optimism and more optimistic belief updates (Kuzmanovic et al., 2015) and between
depression and less optimistic belief updates (Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014), few
studies have used experimental manipulation to assess the relationships between arousal
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and affective states with belief updating biases. In fact, we were only able to identify one
other study that used an experimental manipulation to assess changes in these states by
investigating the effect of acute threat response on biased belief updates (Garrett et al.,
2018), and none that examined relationships between acute emotional states and belief
updating. Based on the previous findings about depression and belief updating, we
hypothesized that some of the acute emotionality (specifically sadness) associated with
depression might explain differences in belief updating between these groups.
Additionally, we expected the psychological construct of hopelessness to be
directly associated with biased belief updating. Hopelessness is related to believing that
positive outcomes are unlikely to occur in the future and this construct is a crucial
component to theories of depression (Alloy, Abramson, Metalsky, & Hartlage, 1988;
Joiner, 2001; Liu, Kleiman, Nestor, & Cheek, 2015). Because hopelessness was related to
both depression and individuals’ beliefs about the likelihood of future positive and
negative events, we hypothesized that this construct would also be related to optimistic
belief updating and that the optimistic belief updating bias would be decreased in
individuals with higher acute hopelessness scores prior to completing the belief updating
task. However, our analysis did not reveal a statistically significant effect of hopelessness
on belief updating.
There are a few reasons that we may not have observed the hypothesized effect.
First, there was not a large amount of variance observed between the different induction
and information groups on the hopelessness variable (see Table 3.2). Despite the
successful induction of sad mood and associations between hopelessness and depression,
it appears that the induction may not have had a major effect on individual’s feelings of
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hopelessness as measured in this study. That said, the present study utilized a brief
version of a more extensive hopelessness measure to assess acute hopelessness. While
this measure has been used in prior research to assess acute hopelessness in EMA
research (Aish et al., 2001), it has not been extensively validated for the measurement of
hopelessness following inductions in experimental research and may be less sensitive to
changes in hopelessness than the full form of the BHS.
Second, it is possible that the traditional analytic methods used in this analysis
were not sensitive to intra-individual variation in hopelessness and these differences
between induction groups. Intra-individual variation has been proposed as a crucial
component of better understanding decision-making in the context of individuals as
dynamical systems, especially in experimental research (Jensen, 1992; Nesselroade &
Ram, 2004). Accordingly, failing to account for these individual differences may have
resulted in a failure of our models to detect an effect.
Third, it possible that the hypothesized effect is simply not present. While the
connection between hopelessness and beliefs about future negative events appears face
valid, research in this area is limited and we know of no studies that have used
experimental induction to test relationships between hopelessness and belief updating.
One recent study found correlations between hopelessness and less optimistic affective
forecasts (i.e., beliefs about how one will feel in the future) (Bauer et al., 2022), but did
not include measures of belief updating or experimental inductions of affect to test
relationships. Based on these data, further research evaluating relationships between
hopelessness and biases associated with future-oriented cognitions are needed to further
elucidate how cognitive and affective constructs associated with depression interact.
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While we did not observe the hypothesized effect of induction group on belief
updates in the main analyses, we did observe a significant main effect of induction and
interaction effect of induction by information in our exploratory analyses. Importantly,
this model differed from the main analyses by including trial level observations of belief
updates with participants included as a random effect. This allowed for modelling the
relationships between constructs of interest (i.e., induction, information, EE, and
covariates measuring individual event appraisals), while accounting for individual
differences in responding and trial-to-trial variation.
This finding has two important implications to be considered. First, as previously
noted, accounting for intra-individual variation in experimental research can help address
differences in individual response patterns and improve inferences about relationships
between hypothesized variables (Jensen, 1992; Nesselroade & Ram, 2004). Specifically,
in the context of the belief updating paradigm, Marks and Baines (2017) previously
demonstrated that traditional methods of analyzing the belief update procedure, including
the main analyses in the present study, failed to identify relationships between their
variables of interest (e.g., whether trials used positive or negative events) and belief
updating. The fact that our findings demonstrate clear interaction and main effects for
induction in LMM suggest that LMM offers more precise and clean analysis of
experimental data while accounting for trial-by-trial variation relative to previously used
generalized linear and ANOVA modeling.
Of note, our LMM did not indicate a significant main effect of information type
(i.e., desirable versus undesirable) on belief updates, despite the extensive history of
findings supporting this effect and the presence of this effect in our primary analysis.
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There was no presence of this effect due to the presence of EE as a covariate in the LMM
models. While information type indicates the direction of the information (i.e., whether or
not it is desirable or undesirable), EE indicates both the direction and magnitude of the
difference between the initial estimate and the aBR. Including EE is crucial to include in
the LMM, as the magnitude of the difference between initial estimates and the aBR
should be closely related to the magnitude of the BU, particularly in a trial-by-trial
analysis. Therefore, the significant effect of EE on BU in the LMM negated the main
effect of information on the model, while information needed to be included to
understand the interaction effect between the direction of information with induction
group.
Second, the presence of a significant interaction between information desirability
and induction group suggest that emotional states are related to the cognitive processes
involved in the prediction of the likelihood of future negative events. The observed
interaction indicates that belief updates following the negative mood induction were
greater for undesirable information relative to desirable information. This is consistent
with our hypothesized effect and due to the temporal relationship established between the
experimental mood induction and changes in response to belief updates for desirable
versus undesirable information suggest that this relationship may be causal. In other
words, because the differences in responding to belief updates followed the mood
inductions, it can be inferred that the change in affect likely caused the changes in
cognitive processes related to belief updating.
This finding is important for a number of reasons. First, it indicates that
individuals’ judgements about the likelihood of future negative events are affected by
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emotional states. Because individual decision-making is partially based on anticipated
emotions about future events and outcomes of those decisions (DeWall, Baumeister,
Chester, & Bushman, 2016; Mellers & McGraw, 2001), the present study suggests how
current affective states may interact with cognitions about the future to affect decisionmaking. Furthermore, the cognitive-affective interaction identified in this study could
demonstrate how dysphoric or acutely sad individuals may experience altered cognitive
processes that lead to engagement with behaviors that could in turn worsen these
affective states. This would result in a cognitive-affective-behavioral feedback loop
consistent with the cognitive triad proposed by Hollon and Beck (1979). In their
formulation, depressive symptoms are developed and maintained through a process
where dysphoric emotions lead to altered cognitions which in turn lead to behaviors that
maintain this loop. The present study explores the first association indicated in this model
and provides support for the cognitive theory of depression.
Second, it is important to note that the present study does not indicate that sadness
is associated with a cognitive bias toward more pessimistic appraisals of future events,
but instead that neutral moods are associated with an optimism bias that is not associated
with acute sadness. This is consistent with the proposed “psychological immune system,”
which posits the presence of a psychological system that prioritizes the assimilation of
information that will support psychological health and the de-prioritizes the assimilation
of information that is detrimental to well-being (Mandelbaum, 2018). In the present
study, this manifests as a failure to effectively integrate bad news (undesirable
information) that could be potentially damaging to one’s psychological well-being (by
causing feelings of distress related to potential future negative events and outcomes) and
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vice versa. However, in the presence of acute sadness, individuals appeared to
demonstrate “immune neglect” or the failure to assimilate information in systematically
biased way that is protective of one’s psychological health (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson,
Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).
This research has several clinical implications based on these findings. By
supporting the connection between emotional states and cognitions about the likelihood
of future negative events, this research is consistent with therapeutic interventions based
on the cognitive-behavioral model (Hollon & Beck, 1979). However, because the biased
cognitions identified in this study appear to be related to psychological immunity and
follow affective changes temporally, traditional cognitive-behavioral strategies, such as
challenging cognitive distortions, may not be beneficial to the patient. Instead, it may be
more helpful to target these states themselves by developing skills to improve distress
tolerance, emotion regulation, and mindfulness during acute affective states (Linehan,
2020) to reduce the impact of these cognitions on daily functioning and decision-making,
thus disrupting the cognitive triad. It may also be beneficial to educate patients about the
psychological immune system and the relationships between affective states and biased
cognitions (Rosenzweig, 2016). Because psychological immunity is inconsistent with
realistic appraisals of future negative events and challenging realistic appraisals would
likely be counterproductive and unintuitive, some patients may find value in
understanding the relationship between mood, belief updating biases, and decisionmaking. By understanding the connections between emotions and biased cognitions,
individuals may be empowered to accept these differences and rely on more objective
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reasoning to engage in healthy behaviors that can strengthen the psychological immune
system and reduce focus on cognitions that could exacerbate negative emotional states.
4.1.1 Limitations and Future Directions
The present study includes several limitations that may reduce generalizability
and inferences about these findings. First, the present study used a population of
undergraduate students who were completing this study for course credit, reducing the
ability to generalize findings to other populations. Importantly, we did not assess effects
within a clinical population, specifically individuals with depression. Because depressive
symptoms have been found to be associated with reduced optimism bias, future research
should incorporate these populations. Potential directions could include testing whether
being taught specific strategies to mitigate acute feelings of sadness or distress are
associated with alterations to belief updating patterns. Second, the measure of acute
hopelessness employed in the study has been used in EMA research but has not been
extensively validated as a measure for hopelessness and therefore findings regarding the
second hypothesis are inconclusive. Future research using more robust measures should
be used to assess relationships between hopelessness and optimistic belief updating.
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION
The present study investigated the relationships between acute sadness,
hopelessness, and belief updating. Results replicated prior findings regarding optimism
bias when presented with desirable information relative to undesirable information.
Additionally, while primary analyses did not find an association between induced sadness
and belief updating biases, follow-up analyses that accounted for intra-individual and
trial-by-trial variation indicated that experiencing a sadness mood induction interacted
with the type of information received (i.e., desirable versus undesirable) to reduce
optimism bias. These findings are consistent with relationships proposed by the cognitive
theory of depression and psychological immunity. Future research should explore clinical
implications of these findings and how affective states can be managed to reduce focus
on future negative events.
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